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1 Introduction
Tax evasion is the illegal concealment of a taxable activity. Measuring how
much economic activity is concealed will always be difficult since those who
engage in evasion have every motivation to hide their activities. Even so,
the estimates that are available from official sources (such as H.M. Revenue
and Customs, 2010) and from academic researchers (Schneider and Enste,
2000) are in agreement that evasion is an economically significant activity.
This emphasizes the importance of the understanding the decision process of
a taxpayer when choosing whether to comply with tax law or to engage in
evasion. A good theory of the compliance decision is essential for designing
an audit policy that deters evasion.
The initial analysis of the compliance decision by Allingham and Sandmo
(1972) modelled the taxpayer as facing a decision under risk, with the extent
of evasion chosen to maximize expected utility. The model provides precise
comparative statics predictions but these are not in accord with data (Clot-
felter, 1983; Crane and Nourzad, 1986) or intuition. In particular, when
evaluated using levels of the audit probability and the fine rate close to those
observed in practice, the model predicts that all taxpayers should engage
in evasion. This has motivated numerous extensions of the standard model
(which are surveyed by Pyle (1991) and Sandmo (2005)), but these extensions
do not address the fundamental limitations of the model.
Two sets of issues have to be addressed in constructing an improved
model. First, behavioral economics has demonstrated that individuals gen-
erally do not evaluate risky prospects using the objective probabilities of
events. In practice, decisions are made using subjective probabilities that
can differ significantly from the objective probability. Contributions drawing
on these ideas from behavioral economics have been made by al-Nowaihi and
Dhami (2007), Arcand and Graziosi (2005), and Snow and Warren (2005).
Second, there is now compelling empirical evidence (Spicer and Lundstedt,
1976) and experimental evidence (Baldry, 1986) that the tax evasion decision
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is not simply an individualistic gamble. Instead, a wide range of social and
psychological factors enter the compliance decision. Gordon (1989) analyzed
a psychic cost of evasions, Myles and Naylor (1996) introduced a social cus-
tom into compliance, and the concept of tax morale (Torgler, 2002) subsumes
a range of social and equity factors. For reasonable parameter values these
recent models can predict the levels of evasion that are consistent with the
data.
An issue that has not been given much attention is the processes through
which the attitude towards compliance - summarized in the social custom
and the belief about auditing captured by the subjective probability - are
formed. Attitudes and beliefs are not exogenous but must result from in-
teraction with other taxpayers and with the tax authority. The appropriate
method for modelling such interaction is a social network that allows endoge-
nous evolution of attitudes and beliefs. Placing appropriate structure on the
social network can also permit investigation of how the degree of separation
determines the divergence of attitudes and beliefs that can emerge among
distinctive social groups in a heterogeneous society.
Attitudes and beliefs are not only important for how a taxpayer will act
when confronted with an evasion opportunity: they are equally important in
determining whether a taxpayer is confronted with that opportunity. This
is because opportunities for evasion are very limited in most forms of em-
ployment. The deduction of income tax at source and third-party reporting
make evasion of employment income very difficult if not impossible. In con-
trast, income earned in self-employment (or entrepreneurship) is not taxed
at source and can have limited third-party reporting. This makes it possible
to undertake evasion when in self-employment. When an individual makes
a choice of occupation the possibility of evasion in self-employment must be
taken into account, which makes occupational choice partly dependent on
the perceived benefit of evasion.
This paper seeks to combine these ideas and to explore the endogenous
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emergence of group-specific attitudes and beliefs. We embed a behavioral
model of evasion decision into a social network, through which information
on the activities of the revenue service is transmitted. Individual taxpayers
are heterogenous in several dimensions such as skill in employment, attitude
to risk, and success in self-employment. We also include a choice between
occupations that differ in the riskiness of reward and the opportunity to
engage in evasion. The model is analyzed by simulation, which permits us
to trace the tax evasion dynamics that emerge from repeated taxpayer in-
teraction within the network. The endogenous separation of taxpayers into
occupations with differing evasion opportunities creates different behavioral
types who comply to different degrees and can develop differing attitudes
and beliefs. The network has fundamental randomness because of risky out-
comes in self-employment and the random selection of taxpayers for audit.
There is always variation, but the level of beliefs and attitudes vary around
steady levels. These levels are affected period-to-period by switches between
occupation that occur as attitudes and beliefs evolve.
The central result that emerges from the analysis is that risk aversion,
occupational choice, compliance, and attitude to evasion are inter-related
and mutually reinforcing. The true probability of audit is unknown, so tax-
payers learn a subjective probability through information transmission via
social interaction. The simulations show that interaction can sustain a sub-
jective probability of audit that exceeds the objective probability. Thus, the
model provides an illustration of how beliefs can be formed in subjective
expected utility theory. The simulations demonstrate how taxpayers self-
select into occupations in a way that maximizes the amount of tax evasion.
Self-employment is risky, so it is chosen by those with lower degrees of risk
aversion. But it also opens the opportunity to evade, and those with a low
risk aversion will evade the most when given the opportunity. Hence, we see
a process of self-selection of those who will evade the most into a situation
where they can evade. The self-selection is reflected in the levels of com-
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pliance of the different occupational groups: compliance in the most risky
occupation is lowest. The endogenous choice of occupation results in different
groups having markedly different rates of compliance. The attitude toward
compliance also differs across the occupational groups. The information ex-
change between people in the same occupation reinforces groups beliefs, and
sustains different social customs across groups. Taxpayers in the riskier oc-
cupation comply less, and this is mutually reinforcing with a lower value of
the social custom. In this sense the network can permit group-specific social
attitudes to develop.
We develop our analysis under two possible processes for the formation
of subjective beliefs. As studies have reliably demonstrated important de-
viations from Bayesian inference (e.g. Grether, 1980), we allow for non-
Bayesian updating. The first process, which is qualitatively similar to a
Bayesian process, assumes that taxpayers revise their estimation of audit
probability upward after experiencing an audit, and reduce their estimation
of audit probability if not audited. The second process we consider exhibits
the “bomb-crater” effect - documented experimentally by Guala and Mit-
tone (2005), Kastlunger et al. (2009), Maciejovsky et al. (2007) and Mit-
tone (2006) - whereby taxpayers revise their estimation of audit probability
downward after experiencing an audit, and increase their estimation of audit
probability if not audited. This process is a more marked deviation from
Bayesian inference. Our central results are robust to both processes. How-
ever, the bomb-crater effect leads to a higher level of compliance that the
target effect, but taxpayers in the risky occupation comply less.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the separate
components that are built into the model. Section 3 provides analytical
details on how these components are implemented. Section 4 describes the
simulation results. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Modelling
This section describes the separate elements that constitute the model. The
intention is to place them into the context of the literature.
2.1 Subjective beliefs
The analysis of the evasion decision by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) applied
expected utility theory. The standard interpretation is that the expectation
is taken using the objective probability of an audit. One criticism of the
model is that it over-predicts the extent of evasion when evaluated using the
objective probability. This has motivated the application of different forms
of non-expected utility theory to the evasion decision. These are surveyed in
Hashimzade et al. (2011).
The situation is referred to as one of risk when the decision maker knows
the probabilities of events. However, these probabilities can be distorted into
“decisions weights” to form the expected payoff. Rank dependent expected
utility (Quiggin, 1981, 1982; Quiggin and Wakker, 1994) uses a particular
weighting scheme to transform the objective probability of events into sub-
jective probabilities and has been applied to the evasion decision by Arcand
and Graziosi (2005), Bernasconi (1998) and Eide (2002). Prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) also uses a
weighting scheme but payoffs are determined by gains and losses relative to
a reference point. Applications to compliance include al-Nowaihi and Dhami
(2007), Bernasconi and Zanardi (2004), Rablen (2010), and Yaniv (1999).
Uncertainty occurs when the decision maker does not know the probabil-
ities. It has been modelled by assuming the decision maker forms a proba-
bility distribution over possible probabilities of outcomes. This gives rise to
the concept of “ambiguity” which has been surveyed in Camerer and Weber
(1992) and applied by Snow and Warren (2005).
Non-expected utility model can predict the correct level of evasion for
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reasonable parameter values. This is because they permit the subjective
probability of audit (the weighting on the payoff when audited) to be greater
than the objective probability. They also open the possibility of designing
compliance policy to manipulate the subjective nature of the decision (Elffers
and Hessing, 1997). We incorporate these ideas into the analysis by assuming
the probability is subjective and providing an explicit process through which
the subjective belief is formed. The model therefore provides an endogenous
explanation of subjective probabilities that are systematically different to the
objective probabilities.
2.2 Social customs
The experiments of Baldry (1986) suggest that the evasion decision is sys-
tematically different from a straightforward gamble. One explanation for this
finding is that choosing to evade results in costs being incurred. These can
be real financial costs, such as the payment for avoidance services, or the loss
of return through using a hidden investment instrument. They can also be
psychic costs that arise through the fear of detection, or the shame of being
exposed.
Bayer (2006) assumes that concealing income has a direct financial cost.
A different interpretation of this cost is provided by Lee (2001), who assumes
a taxpayer can reduce the assessed income after audit by paying an additional
cost (such as a reduction in return from using concealed investments or the
cost of professional advice for securing income in non-taxable forms).
An alternative approach is to view the cost as a psychic, rather than
financial, cost. The magnitude of the psychic cost suffered by an evader
may then reflect an individual’s underlying attitudes towards compliance -
an important feature of psychological theories of tax evasion (e.g. Kirchler et
al., 2008; Weigel et al., 1987). Gordon (1989) formally incorporates psychic
costs into the evasion decision. He interprets such psychic costs as arising
from the social setting in which the taxpayer operates, so are a result of the
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loss of social prestige or reputation. An alternative to the psychic cost is
the “conscience parameter” of Eisenhauer (2006, 2008). In this formulation
of the compliance decision an individual recognizes that evading tax results
in free-riding on the taxes paid by compliant taxpayers. This generates a
sense of guilt for the tax evader. The guilt is represented by discounting the
untaxed income by the moral equivalent of a tax rate.
An alternative interpretation of the psychic cost is that it represents the
loss of the payoff from a social norm to honest tax payment. Under this
interpretation it become natural to assume that the additional cost is gen-
erated by explicit social interaction, with the cost an increasing function of
the proportion of taxpayers who do not evade. This formulation captures the
fact that more social prestige will be lost the more out of step the taxpayer is
with the remainder of society. This approach has been developed by Fortin
et al. (2007), Kim (2003), Myles and Naylor (1996), and Traxler (2010) to
show that reputation effects can lead to multiple equilibria and epidemics of
evasion.
The existence of additional costs seems essential to explain some features
of the tax evasion decision. To capture underlying attitudes towards com-
pliance, we choose to include in the model a social custom of honest tax
payment, so there is a utility loss once the custom is broken. The social
custom is influenced by interaction in the social network, which emphasizes
the importance of the links between individuals.
2.3 Occupational choice
There are two reasons why occupational choice is important in the context
of evasion. Firstly, there are differences in the possibility of concealing in-
come in different occupations. This is partly due to the operation of the
tax system. For example, the UK employs the Pay-As-You-Earn system in
which income tax is deducted directly from the salaries of employees. This
prevents any opportunity for evasion (except in collaboration with the em-
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ployer). Secondly, the nature of the occupation can explain whether there is
a tradition of payment in cash, and different occupations can support differ-
ent social customs. It is therefore important that the choice of occupation be
built into the model. Occupational choice is not an issue that has featured
prominently in the literature on tax evasion, although Cowell (1981) and
Isachsen and Strøm (1980) consider the choice between work in the regular
and informal economy.
The choice of occupation also has another aspect that is of interest from
a theoretical perspective. It is standard to assume that occupations differ in
the combination of risk and reward that they offer. For instance, employment
can be taken as the least risky occupation with all forms of self-employment
having greater risk. Individuals allocate to occupations on the basis of their
ability at that occupation and their attitude to risk. This is the basis of
the analysis of Kanbur (1979) and Black and de Meza (1997) that addresses
whether aggregate risk-taking is socially efficient. In particular, they are
concerned with whether an inefficiently low proportion of individuals enter
risky occupations and, if so, whether tax policy can be used to raise welfare.
Evasion has been incorporated into this model of occupational choice by
Pestieau and Possen (1981). The possibility of evasion in the risky occupation
has an interesting implication: if there is too little risk-taking without tax
evasion then the possibility of evading encourages risk-taking. In this case
setting policy to reduce evasion will drive risk-taking further from the social
optimum. At the same time, a more relaxed tax enforcement would serve
as an indirect subsidy and may, therefore, improve welfare. The converse
of this argument is that taxation has a variance-reducing effect on earnings
from self-employment (government engages in risk-sharing), and, therefore,
encourages self-employment. Evasion has the opposite effect and raises the
variance again. So, from this argument, policy should try to reduce evasion.
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2.4 Social networks
Tax evasion is an illegal act which has to be concealed from public view.
Similarly, revenue services have an incentive not to reveal their audit strate-
gies. Together, these imply that taxpayers are not fully informed and can
gain from obtaining additional information. It seems natural to assume that
information will not be publicly traded, but will be passed between taxpayers
who are in a position of mutual trust. It is this situation that is modelled by
the social network.
The importance of social contacts is supported by empirical evidence.
There is a positive connection between the number of tax evaders known to
a taxpayer and the level of that taxpayer’s own evasion (De Juan et al., 1994;
Geeroms and Wilmots, 1985; Spicer and Lundstedt, 1976; Wallschutzky,
1984; Webley et al., 1988). This suggests that the compliance decision is
not made in isolation by each taxpayer but is made with reference to the
norms and observed behavior of the general society of the taxpayer.
This social interaction is captured through the application of network the-
ory, as described in Goyal (2009) and Jackson (2003). In particular, we wish
to apply recent advances in the endogenous formation of networks (Page
and Wooders, 2009) to track change in the network over time, especially
changes produced by switches in occupational choice. There is some existing
work using networks in evasion analysis. Korobow et al. (2007) considers
agent-based simulations in a simple network. Franklin (2009) looks at more
complex networks but with a simpler model of the compliance decision. Net-
works have also been applied to the analysis of crime more generally (Glaeser
et al., 1996).
The social network in the model plays two roles. First, it transmits
the social custom from one person to another. If two non-evaders meet
then the social custom of honest payment is reinforced, but if a non-evader
meets an evader then it is reduced. Second, the audit policy of the revenue
service is not public information. Individuals infer its policy partly from their
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own experience and partly by receiving information about the experiences of
others. The simulation approach we employ can be seen as an application
of agent-based modelling (Bloomquist, 2004; Tesfatsion, 2003) with agent
interaction controlled by network structure.
2.5 Auditing
The design of an audit strategy is based on the trade-off between the costs
of audits and the effect of audits on revenue. Contributions to the existing
literature can be distinguished by the objective of audit policy and the policy
tools that are subject to choice.
The analysis of audit strategy began with Kolm (1973) who considered
the choice of fine and audit probability with the objective of minimizing the
evasion level. Since the fine was assumed costless to increase, but auditing
costly, the optimal policy found by Kolm was to audit with a low probability
but levy an extreme fine on anyone caught. Similar conclusions were reached
by Christiansen (1980). The immediate objection to this analysis is that
the revenue service does not have the freedom to vary policy in this way.
The economics of crime implies fines should be part of a broader punishment
strategy and not directly under the control of the tax administration. Also,
the audit policy was constructed for a homogenous population of taxpay-
ers. In practice, a major aspect of compliance policy is to determine which
members of a heterogeneous population should be the focus of auditing.
These issues are addressed by Reinganum and Wilde (1985, 1986), who
consider a population that differs in income and are audited on the basis
of reported income. The level of fines is taken as given, so the revenue
service only needs to determine the audit probability for each income report.
Chander andWilde (1998) extend the analysis to incorporate a labour supply
decision, which endogenizes the pre-tax income distribution.
We follow this literature, and practice, by assuming that the revenue
service takes the tax rate and the fine rate as given. The policy instrument
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of the revenue service is the probability with which it audits each taxpayer.
We assume that the revenue service is informed about the occupation of each
taxpayer, so is able to condition the audit probability upon occupation. It is
also assumed that the objective of the revenue service is to maximize the sum
of tax revenue plus revenue from fines. Under this objective, it is indifferent
as to whether tax revenue arises from an honest report or is recovered after
an audit.
3 A Model
In this section we model the formation of attitudes and beliefs as the out-
come of social interaction, and opportunities as the outcome of occupational
choice. This is achieved by applying the theory of network formation to track
the links between taxpayers and the transmission of attitudes and beliefs,
and combining this with agent-based modelling which employs behavioral
approach to describe individual choices.
There are n individuals interacting repeatedly; time is discrete. Each
period the preferred occupation and optimal level of evasion is chosen.1 The
operation of the model begins by assigning a random vector of characteristics
to each taxpayer, with all characteristics drawn independently from a vector
of independent distributions. Each individual is characterized by a vector of
parameters {w, ρ, q1, q2; p, χ}. The first four parameters are assigned to the
taxpayer at the outset of the analysis and remain constant. These parameters
are:
w ≡ wage in employment;
ρ ≡ coefficient of relative risk aversion;
qi ≡ probability of success in self-employed occupation i, i = 1, 2.
The remaining two parameters are updated through interaction in the social
1Here the network is fixed. Another possibility would be to have the network revised
as a consequence of chosen actions, i.e. employed and self-employed belonging to different
social networks.
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network. They are:
p ≡ perceived (subjective) probability of audit;
χ ≡ weight attached to payoff from the social custom.
We now describe how these variables enter into the choice problem of a
taxpayer and how the subjective probability and weight attached to social
custom are updated.
At the start of every period an individual has a choice between employ-
ment or entering one of the two self-employment occupations. If employment
is chosen the wage, w, is obtained with certainty. The self-employment op-
portunities are represented as risky “projects”. Project i (i = 1, 2) has a
probability of success, qi, a pay-off of piis, if successful, and a pay-off pi
i
u if un-
successful, where piis > pi
i
u > 0. Note that the probability of success is specific
to an individual, whereas the payoffs are specific to the projects and, there-
fore, are the same for all individuals undertaking a given project. Project
1 is termed riskier than project 2 in the sense that pi1u < pi
2
u, pi
1
s > pi
2
s, and
pi1u + pi
1
s > pi
2
u + pi
2
s.
2
It is not possible to evade tax in employment. The possibility of evading
arises when self-employment is chosen. In this case, the taxpayer has the
belief that the probability of evasion being detected equals p. The value of
the perceived probability of detection is updated through the experience of
the taxpayer with audits and through exchange of information when meeting
other taxpayers. The choice of occupation and the choice of evasion level
involve risk. Each taxpayer has a (constant) degree of relative risk aversion
measured by the risk aversion parameter, ρ. Taxpayers maximize subjec-
tive expected utility, and for analytical tractability, we assume throughout a
CRRA form for utility:
U (Y ) =
Y 1−ρ − 1
1− ρ
. (1)
There is a social custom that rewards honest tax payment. The payoff from
2We cannot talk about the mean and variance of the projects because the probabilities
of the states differ across taxpayers.
13
the social custom is given by z and the individual weight, or the importance,
assigned to this payoff by the taxpayer is determined by χ. Hence, compliance
with tax payment generates an additional utility from the social custom of
χz. At each point in time the payoff is a fixed parameter for each taxpayer,
but the weight changes over time through interaction with other taxpayers
in the network.
In employment there is no opportunity for evasion. The taxpayer obtains
a payoff given by
V0 =
[(1− τ )w]1−ρ − 1
1− ρ
+ χz,
where τ is the constant marginal tax rate. The possibility of tax evasion
makes the choice of self-employment a compound lottery: the outcome of the
project is random, as is the outcome of choosing to evade. Define the expected
payoff from the optimal choice of evasion in self-employment occupation i in
state v, (v = s, u) as
V iv = max
Eiv∈[0,pi
i
v]
{
p
[(1− τ )piiv − fτE
i
v]
1−ρ
− 1
1− ρ
+ (1− p)
[(1− τ) piiv + τpE
i
v]
1−ρ
− 1
1− ρ
+ χz1[Eiv=0],
where Eiv is the amount of evasion in state v for occupation i, and f > 1 is
the fine levied if evasion is detected. The term 1[A] is an indicator function
that takes the value one if A is true and zero otherwise: the payoff from the
social custom is obtained if there is no evasion. The expected payoff from
the compound lottery describing occupation i is then
V ie = q
iV is +
(
1− qi
)
V iu . (2)
The choice of occupation is made by comparing the utility levels from employ-
ment and from self-employment. Hence, occupation is given by the maximum
of {V0, V
1
e , V
2
e }.
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If self-employment occupation i is chosen the outcome piis or pi
i
u is ran-
domly realized, with probabilities qi and 1 − qi, respectively. Given the
outcome, the evasion decision is implemented, as described above. Those in
self-employment occupation i are then audited, according to a process chosen
by the revenue service. If evasion is discovered then unpaid tax is reclaimed
and a fine is imposed on unpaid tax.
A network is modelled as a set of bidirectional links, described by an n×n
symmetric matrix of zeros and ones. For example, the network shown in the
diagram below is described by matrix A:
1
2
3
4
A =

0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0

Figure 1: Representation of network
In the model, the matrix is created at the outset and does not change.
The network determines who may meet who to exchange information. In each
period a random selection of meetings occur; this is described by a matrix
C of zeros and ones which is randomly selected every period. Individuals i
and j meet during a period if AijCij = 1. At a meeting of i and j there is a
probability that information is exchanged. When information is exchanged it
consists of the subjective probability of audit and whether the taxpayer was
compliant in that period. The probability of information exchange depends
on the occupational groups to which i and j belong; the probability is highest
when they are in like occupations. The probabilities of information exchange
occurring at a meeting are given by pij where i, j = e, 1, 2.
We consider two different processes for the formation of subjective beliefs.
The first process is to assume that individuals feel marked as targets if they
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are audited, so that one audit is believed likely to be followed by another.
We term this the “target effect”. In contrast, those not detected in a period
believe they are less likely to be audited in the next period. Formally, if
audited in period t, an individual’s belief about being audited in the next
period is raised to the level P , otherwise it decays. The updating rule for
the subjective probability is therefore
p˜t+1 =
{
P if audited at t,
dpt, d ∈ [0, 1] otherwise.
(3)
The second process captures the “bomb-crater” effect. In this process a
taxpayer who has been audited in one period believes that they will not be
audited in the next, but the belief slowly rises over time. The process is
therefore described by
p˜t+1 =
{
0 if audited at t,
(1− δ) pt + δ, δ ∈ [0, 1] otherwise.
(4)
The choice of occupation in period t + 1 is made on the basis of the belief
p˜t+1. After occupational choice is made, if an information exchange occurs
at a meeting with another individual, the subjective probability is updated
according to the rule
pit+1 = µp˜
i
t+1 + (1− µ) p˜
j
t+1. (5)
Thus, the perceived probability of evasion of being detected is determined
by the individual’s own past experience and by the subjective belief of a
randomly met member of that individual’s social network.
The importance assigned to the social custom is also determined by in-
teraction in the social network. Each individual is randomly assigned a level
of importance, χi0, at time 0. This value is then updated each period if there
is an information exchange between two individuals. The updating process
is described by
χit+1 =
1
X(i) + 1
[
χitX(i) + 1[Ejt=0]
]
, (6)
16
where X(i) is the number of previous meetings for i at which information
was exchanged. Hence, χit+1 > χ
i
t if information is exchanged with an honest
taxpayer, and χit+1 < χ
i
t if information is exchanged with an evader.
4 Results
The network model described above is simulated to investigate the nature
of the equilibrium and the consequences of alternative updating rules on
beliefs. This section summarizes and discusses the most significant findings
that emerge from the simulations. Results are reported for the two methods
of updating beliefs in eqns. (3) and (4). In addition, for the target effect, we
also consider the effect of varying the probability of exchanging information.
The parameter values and the distributions for the random variables that
remain constant across the simulations are given in the appendix.
4.1 Target effect
In the case of the target effect the subjective probability is increased after an
audit and decays when no auditing occurs. Two set of results are given for
this process of belief formation, which differ in the probability of information
exchange between different groups. Both sets of results are based on a true
audit probability of 0.05 and a rate of decay in belief of d = 0.75
The first set of results emphasizes the differences that can emerge be-
tween groups by assuming that, when two taxpayers in the same occupation
meet, information is exchanged for sure, but when two taxpayers in different
groups meet no information is exchanged. This is termed focussed informa-
tion exchange.
The results are summarized in Figure 2. The simulation is run for 200
periods. It can be seen that the effect of the initial random assignment of
values to the subjective probability and the honest weight is negligible after
about 20 periods. The level of compliance - measured by the proportion of
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income declared - is lowest for occupation 1 which is the riskier of the two
forms of self-employment. Occupation 2 has a rate of compliance that is
about twice that of occupation 1. The remaining three figures explain the
source of this difference. What is interesting is that the difference in com-
pliance between occupations does not come from the subjective probability.
The average belief of taxpayers in both occupations is approximately 0.17.
This is much higher than the true probability of 0.05, but does not explain
the different compliance rates. The employed learn about audits only from
self-employed who have been audited and switched into employment as a re-
sult. Hence, the subjective probability of the employed decays to just below
(on average) the true value. The second driver of the difference in compli-
ance is the weight given to the social custom. This is significantly lower in
occupation 1 than in occupation 2, and close to 1 among the employed. The
social custom reinforces the separation by risk aversion, and these jointly
determine the compliance outcome.
The network effects can be seen to endogenously generate a culture of
non-compliance that varies across groups. The non-compliance is not driven
by differences in beliefs but by self-selection into occupations according to
risk aversion and reinforced by the emergence of distinct group-specific social
customs. This illustrates the process of endogenous behavioral differences
among population sub-groups.
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Figure 2: Focussed information exchange
(pee = 1; pe1 = 0; pe2 = 0; p11 = 1; p22 = 1; p12 = 0)
The second set of results report the outcome with diffused information
transmission. In this case there is a positive probability (0.15) that a meeting
between taxpayers in dissimilar occupations results in information exchange.
In addition, the probability of information exchange at meetings between
members of the same occupation is reduced (compared to the results in figure
2) to 0.75. Figure 3 shows the effect that this has upon the outcome of
the simulation. Compared to Figure 1 there is very little change in the
rate of compliance (but it is slightly higher for self-employed occupation 1),
the separation by risk aversion, or the levels of the subjective probability.
The only significant difference between the two set of results is seen in the
weight attached to the social custom. The diffused information transmission
means that some employed taxpayers exchange information with evaders,
and evaders in the self-employed occupations have an increased probability
of meeting a compliant taxpayer. As a consequence, the social custom weight
19
among the employed is reduced, while that among occupation 1 is increased.
This enhanced importance of the social custom in occupation 1 explains the
slightly higher compliance level of that group.
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Figure 3: Diffused information exchange
(pee = 0.75; pe1 = 0.15; pe2 = 0.15; p11 = 0.75; p22 = 0.75; p12 = 0.75)
The central message of these results is that sub-groups of the population
can endogenously form different attitudes to compliance. These differing
attitudes combine with self-selection into occupations to produce significantly
differing levels of compliance across occupations. The social network also
results in the subjective probability of audit being above the true value for
the self-employed. The self-employed groups hold similar beliefs, which are
distinctly different from those of the employed. These features highlight the
importance of social networking effects in explaining patterns of compliance.
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4.2 Bomb-crater effect
The final set of results explore the outcome when the probability of audit is
updated according to the bomb-crater process. In this case the probability
is revised down after an audit, but then tends upward until the next audit
occurs. The results reported in Figure 4 are for diffused information trans-
mission. The true audit probability is again chosen to be 0.05 and the rate
of increase in belief is δ = 0.05.
The bomb-crater effect leads to a much higher level of compliance that
the target effect, but taxpayers in the risky occupation comply less. This
may seem counter-intuitive, but it is a consequence of the infrequent audits.
The infrequency of audits means that there are numerous periods in which a
taxpayer is not audited and in each of these periods the subjective probability
increases. This effect is especially marked for a taxpayer who always chooses
to be employed: no audit is ever undertaken so the subjective belief increases
toward unity. This may seems highly inconsistent, but the inconsistency is
never tested by the taxpayer because non-compliance cannot take place when
in employment. The groups are still characterized by differing degrees of risk
aversion but for this simulation there is little to separate the employed and
those in the less risky self-employment occupation. The major qualitative
distinction between the bomb-crater effect and the target effect is that the
self-employed groups hold different subjective probabilities: it is lower for
the more risky occupation. The weight attached to the social custom is
again lowest for the risky occupation. The difference in compliance rates is
a consequence of these three differences.
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Figure 4: Alternative process for subjective probability
(pee = 0.75; pe1 = 0.15; pe2 = 0.15; p11 = 0.75; p22 = 0.75; p12 = 0.75)
5 Conclusions
An understanding of the individual tax compliance decision is important for
revenue services. Their aim is to design policy instruments to reduce the tax
gap (the difference between anticipated and actual tax revenue). Empirical
evidence demonstrates that a wide range of factors, including social groupings
and network effects, may impact upon the individual compliance decision.
The research we report in this paper combines ideas from behavioral
economics and social networks to model occupational choice and tax compli-
ance in an integrated framework. The analysis is based on the consequence
of taxpayers possessing social connections through which information and
attitudes relevant to the compliance decision are transmitted. The model
accommodates differences in preferences, in productivity, and in opportu-
nities for evasion. Occupational choice operates as a form of self-selection
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that places those who will evade into situations where evasion is possible.
Social interaction results in the subjective probability differing from the ob-
jective probability. Combined with a social custom that rewards compliance,
this can generate relatively high levels of compliance (when compared to the
“standard” model).
The simulations have considered two different processes for the formation
of subjective beliefs. These are distinguished by whether an audit causes
an increase in the subjective probability (the target effect) or a reduction
(the bomb-crater effect). Although these processes are very different the
important qualitative properties of the simulations are the same in both
cases. First, taxpayers self-select into occupations according to the degree
of risk aversion. Second, the subjective probability of audit can be sustained
above the objective probability. Third, the weight attached to the social
custom differs across occupations, a finding relevant to the literature on the
evolution of social norms (Bendor, 2001; Boyd and Richerson, 1994). Finally,
these factors combine to lead to a compliance level that is lower in the riskier
occupation.
The model has also demonstrated how it is possible for attitudes and be-
liefs to endogenously emerge that differ across sub-groups of the population.
The population is heterogenous in characteristics and chooses occupational
groups on the basis of characteristics. The behavior is different across occu-
pational groups, and this is reinforced by the development of group-specific
attitudes and beliefs.
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Appendix
Parameter values
Tax rate: τ = 0.25
Fine rate: f = 1.5
Payoffs in occupation 1: pi1s = 16; pi
1
u = 6
Payoffs in occupation 2: pi2s = 15; pi
2
u = 5
Weight in information exchange: µ = 0.75
Value of social custom: z = 3 (×10−5)
Probability distributions
Wage in employment: w ∼ U [0, 16]
Risk aversion: ρ ∼ U [0, 10]
Success in occupation i: qi ∼ U [0, 1]
Initial belief on audit probability: pi0 ∼ U [0, 1]
Importance assigned to social custom: χi0 ∼ U [0, 1]
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